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A solution for the paradox of the double-slit experiment
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Laboratoire des Solides Irradie´s, Universite´ Paris-Saclay,
F-91128-Palaiseau CEDEX, FRANCE
We argue that the double-slit experiment can be understood much better by considering it as an experiment
whereby one uses electrons to study the set-up rather than an experiment whereby we use a set-up to study the
behaviour of electrons. We also show how the concept of undecidability can be used in an intuitive way to make
sense of the double-slit experiment and the quantum rules for calculating coherent and incoherent probabilities.
We meet here a situation where the electrons always behave in a fully deterministic way (following Einstein’s
conception of reality), while the detailed design of the set-up may render the question about the way they move
through the set-up experimentally undecidable (which follows more Bohr’s conception of reality). We show that
the expression ψ1 + ψ2 for the wave function of the double-slit experiment is numerically correct, but logically
flawed. It has to be replaced in the interference region by the logically correct expression ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
, which
has the same numerical value as ψ1 + ψ2, such that ψ
′
1
+ ψ′
2
= ψ1 + ψ2, but with ψ
′
1
=
ψ1+ψ2√
2
eı
pi
4 , ψ1 and
ψ′
2
=
ψ1+ψ2√
2
e−ı
pi
4 , ψ2. Here ψ
′
1
and ψ′
2
are the correct contributions from the slits to the total wave function
ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
. We have then p = |ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
|2 = |ψ′
1
|2 + |ψ′
2
|2 = p1 + p2 such that the paradox that quantum mechanics
(QM) would not follow the traditional rules of probability calculus disappears. The paradox is rooted in the
wrong intuition that ψ1 and ψ2 would be the true physical contributions to ψ
′
1
+ ψ′
2
= ψ1 + ψ2 like in the case
of waves in a water tank. The solution proposed here is not ad hoc but based on an extensive analysis of the
geometrical meaning of spinors within group representation theory and its application to QM. Working further
on the argument one can even show that an interference pattern is the only way to satisfy simultaneously two
conditions: The condition obeying binary logic (in the spirit of Einstein) that the electron has only two mutually
exclusive options to get to the detector (viz. going through slit S1 or going through slit S2) and the condition
obeying ternary logic (in the spirit of Bohr) that the question which one of these two options the electron has
taken is experimentally undecidable.
I. INTRODUCTION
The double-slit experiment has been qualified by Feynman
[1] as the only mystery of QM. Its mystery resides in an ap-
parent paradox between the QM result and what we expect on
the basis of our intuition. What we want to explain in this ar-
ticle is that this apparent paradox is a probability paradox. By
this we mean that the paradox does not reside in some special
property of the electron that could act both as a particle and
a wave, but in the fact that we use two different definitions of
probability in the intuitive approach and in the calculations.
It is the difference between these two definitions which leads
to the paradox, because the two definitions are just incompat-
ible. In our discussion we will very heavily rely on the pre-
sentations by Feynman, even though further strange aspects
have been pointed out by other authors later on, e.g. in the
discussion of the delayed-choice experiment by Wheeler [2]
and of the quantum eraser experiment [3], which can also be
understood based on our discussion. The afore-lying paper is
an introduction to a much longer and detailed paper [4], which
itself relies heavily on a complete monograph [5].
II. FEYNMAN’S ESSENTIALS
Feynman illustrates the paradox by comparing tennis balls
and electrons. Tennis balls comply with classical intuition,
while electrons behave according to the rules of QM. There is
however, a small oversimplification in Feynman’s discussion.
He glosses over a detail, undoubtedly for didactical reasons.
When the electron behaves quantum mechanically and only
one slit is open, the experiment will give rise to diffraction
fringes, which can also not be understood in terms of a classi-
cal description in terms of tennis balls. But the hardest part of
the mystery is that in the quantum mechanical regime we get
a diffraction pattern when only one slit is open, while we get
an interference pattern when both slits are open. This means
that the single-slit probabilities even do not add up to an inter-
ference pattern when we allow for the quantum nature of the
electron in a single-slit experiment. We will therefore com-
pare most of the time the two quantum mechanical situations
rather than electrons and tennis balls.
What Feynman describes very accurately is how quantum
behaviour corresponds to the idea that the electron does not
leave any trace behind in the set-up of its interactions with
it, that would permit to reconstruct its history. (We exclude
here from our concept of a set-up the detectors that register
the electrons at the very end of their history). We cannot tell
with what part of the set-up the electron has interacted, be-
cause the interaction has been coherent. This corresponds to
“wave behaviour”. At the very same energy, a particle can
also interact incoherently with the set-up and this will then
result in classical “particle behaviour”. The difference is that
when the particle has interacted incoherently we do have the
possibility to figure out its path trough the device, because the
electron has left behind indications of its interactions with the
measuring device within the device.
A nice example of this difference between coherent and in-
coherent interactions occurs in neutron scattering. In its inter-
action with the device, the neutron can flip its spin. The con-
2servation of angular momentum implies then that there must
be a concomitant change of the spin of a nucleus within an
atom of the device. At least in principle the change of the
spin of this nucleus could be detected by comparing the sit-
uations before and after the passage of the neutron, such that
the history of the neutron could be reconstructed. Such an
interaction with spin flip corresponds to incoherent neutron
scattering. But the neutron can also interact with the atom
without flipping its spin. There will be then no trace of the
passage of the neutron in the form of a change of spin of a nu-
cleus, and we will never be able to find out the history of the
particle from a post facto inspection of the measuring device.
An interaction without spin flip corresponds to coherent scat-
tering. Note that this discussion only addresses the coherence
of the spin interaction. There are other types of interaction
possible and in order to have a globally coherent process none
of these interactions must leave a mark of the passage of the
neutron in the system that could permit us to reconstruct its
history. An example of an alternative distinction between co-
herent and incoherent scattering occurs in the discussion of
the recoil of the atoms of the device. A crystal lattice can re-
coil as a whole (coherent scattering). Alternatively, the recoil
can just affect a single atom (incoherent scattering).
In incoherent scattering the electron behaves like a tennis
ball. The hardest part of the mystery of the double-slit ex-
periment is thus the paradox which occurs when we compare
coherent scattering in the single-slit and in the double-slit ex-
periment. Feynman resumed this mystery by asking: How can
the particle know if the other slit is open or otherwise? In fact,
as its interactions must be local the electron should not be able
to “sense” if the other slit is open (see below).
III. CAVEATS
Let us now leave our intuition for what it is and turn to
QM. To simplify the formulation, we will in general use the
term probability for what are in reality probability densities.
In a purely QM approach we could make the calculations for
the three configurations of the experimental set-up. We could
solve the wave equations for the single-slit and double-slit ex-
periments:
− ~2
2m
∆ψ1 + V1(r)ψ1 = − ~ı ∂∂tψ1, S1 open, S2 closed,
− ~2
2m
∆ψ2 + V2(r)ψ2 = − ~ı ∂∂tψ2, S1 closed, S2 open,
− ~2
2m
∆ψ3 + V3(r)ψ3 = − ~ı ∂∂tψ3, S1 open, S2 open.
(1)
Here S j refer to the slits. Within this theoretical framework
we would still not obtain the result |ψ3|2 for the double-slit ex-
periment by adding the probabilities |ψ1|2 and |ψ2|2 obtained
from the solutions of the wave equations for the single-slit ex-
periments. The fact that |ψ3|2 , |ψ1|2 + |ψ2|2 is at variance
with our intuition about the rules of probability calculus in a
way that seems to defy all our logic, because we expect the
electron to have only two mutually exclusive options. It must
travel through S1 or through S2. Textbooks tell us that we
should not add up probabilities but probability amplitudes,
|ψ3|2 = |ψ1 + ψ2|2. They describe this as the “superposition
principle”. They define wave functions ψ =
∑
j c jχ j, and cor-
responding probabilities p = |ψ|2 = |∑ j c jχ j|2, whereby one
must combine probability amplitudes rather than probabilities
in a linear way (coherent summing). They compare this to the
addition of the amplitudes of waves like we can observe in a
water tank, as also discussed by Feynman.
It must be pointed out that adding wave functions is cer-
tainly algebraically feasible, but a priori incompatible with
their geometricalmeaning. Wave functions are spinors or sim-
plified versions of them and spinors in representation theory
have a well-defined geometrical meaning, physicists are not
aware of. We can draw an analogy between the situation in
QM and what happens in algebraic geometry, where you have
an algebraic formalism, a geometry and a one-to-one corre-
spondence that translates the geometry into the algebra and
vice versa. In QM the algebra is perfectly known and vali-
dated as exact because it agrees to very high precision with
all experimental data. But the meaning of the algebra, i.e. its
physical interpretation in terms of a geometry and a dictio-
nary is not known. This geometrical meaning is provided by
the group representation theory itself. The point is now, that if
you knew that geometry you would discover that some of the
algebra is undefined geometrical nonsense. Nonetheless this
meaningless algebra leads to the correct final result. This way
it agrees with experimental data, while the geometrical non-
sense leads to the paradoxes. The geometrical meaning of a
spinor is that it is a notation for a group element. Spinors can
a priori not be combined linearly as vectors [5] like physi-
cists do, because in the Lorentz and rotation groups the oper-
ations g2g2 are defined, but the operations c1g1 + c2g2 are not.
Spinors belong to a curved manifold, not a vector space. As
the algebra of QM yields correct results despite this transgres-
sion, a special effort must be made to explain “why the fluke
happens” by finding a posteriori a meaning for the algebraic
procedure of making linear combinations of spinors. This can
be compared to the way we were forced to justify a posteriori
doing algebra with the quantity ı =
√
−1 in mathematics, be-
cause it brought a wealth of meaningful results. It turns then
out that we must distinguish between two principles: a true
superposition principle (which is physically meaningful) and
a Huyghens’ principle (which is physically meaningless but
yields excellent numerical results).
The true superposition principle, based on the linearity of
the equations is that a linear combination ψ =
∑
j c jχ j is a
solution of a Schro¨dinger equation:
− ~
2
2m
∆ψ + V(r)ψ = −~
ı
∂
∂t
ψ. (2)
when all wave functions χ j are solutions of the same
Schro¨dinger equation Eq. 2. This is then a straightforward
mathematical result, and one can argue [4] that it leads to
the probability rule p =
∑
j |c j|2|χ j|2 (incoherent summing),
whereby one combines probabilities p j = |χ j|2 in the classical
way, which corresponds to common sense. But telling that the
solution ψ1 of a first equation with potential V1 can be added
to the solution ψ2 of a second equation with a different poten-
3tial V2 to yield a solution ψ3 for a third equation with a yet
different potential V3 can a priori not be justified by the math-
ematics and is not exact. It has nothing to do with the linearity
of the equations. Summing the equations for ψ1 and ψ2 does
not yield the equation for ψ3. A solution of the wave equa-
tion for the single-slit experiment will not necessarily satisfy
all the boundary conditions of the double-slit experiment, and
vice versa. At the best, ψ3 = ψ1 + ψ2 will in certain physical
situations be an excellent approximation. But the fact that this
is not rigorously exact (in other words logically flawed, be-
cause flawless logic can only yield a result that is rigorously
exact) and should be merely considered as a good numerical
result rather than an exact physical truth is important. In fact,
based on textbook presentations one could believe that it is
an absolute physical truth in principle that one must replace
the traditional rules of probability calculus p3 = p1 + p2 by
substituting the probabilities by their amplitudes. This is just
not true. The belief must be vigorously eradicated because it
leads to the misconception that there could exist a deep logi-
cal principle behind ψ3 = ψ1 + ψ2, that in its proper context
would be a truth that is as unshakable as p3 = p1 + p2 in our
traditional logic and transcend all human understanding. As
discussed below, mistaking the principle of substituting p by ψ
for a deep mysterious absolute truth leads to insuperable con-
ceptual problems in the case of destructive interference where
ψ1(r) + ψ2(r) = 0. The only way to solve this paradox is fol-
lowing the track of the logical loophole. What happens here is
that the procedure of adding spinors is logically flawed but its
result numerically accurate. Of course, agreement with exper-
iment can only validate here the numerical accuracy, not the
flawed logic that has been used to obtain it.
To take this objection into account rigorously, we will de-
fine that the approximate solution ψ3 ≈ ψ1 +ψ2 of the double-
slit wave equation follows a Huyghens’ principle and note it
as ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 to remind that it is only numerically accu-
rate, reserving the term superposition principle for the case
when we combine wave functions that are all solutions of
the same linear equation. We make this distinction between
the superposition principle (with incoherent summing) and a
Huyghens’ principle (with coherent summing) to make sure
that we respect what we can do and what we cannot do with
spinors. This lays also a mathematical basis for justifying that
we have two different rules for calculating probabilities and
that both the incoherent rule p =
∑
j |c j|2|χ j|2 and the coherent
rule p = |ψ|2 = |∑ j c jχ j|2 are correct within their respec-
tive domains of validity. This is the mathematical essence of
the problem. QM just tells us that once we have an exact
pure-state solution of a wave equation, we must square the
amplitude of the wave function to obtain an exact probability
distribution.
The double-slit paradox is so difficult that it has the same
destabilizing effect as gaslighting. One starts doubting about
one’s own mental capabilities. But the very last thing we can
do in face of such a very hard paradox is to capitulate and
think that we are not able to think straight. We will thus cat-
egorically refuse to yield to such defeatism. If we believe in
logic, the rule p3 = p
′
1
+ p′
2
, where p′
1
and p′
2
are the proba-
bilities to traverse the slits in the double-slit experiment, must
still be exact. We are then compelled to conclude that in QM
the probability p′
1
for traversing slit S1 when slit S2 is open is
manifestly different from the probability p1 for traversing slit
S1 when slit S2 is closed. We can then ask with Feynman how
the particle can “know” if the other slit is open or otherwise if
its interactions are local.
IV. LOCAL INTERACTIONS, NON-LOCAL
PROBABILITIES
The solution to that problem is that the interactions of the
electron with the device are locally defined while the proba-
bilities defined by the wave function are not. The probabilities
are non-locally, globally defined. When we follow our intu-
ition, the electron interacts with the device in one of the slits.
The corresponding probabilities are local interaction proba-
bilities. We may take this point into consideration. Following
our intuition we may then think that after doing so we are
done. But in QM the story does not end here. The probabili-
ties are globally defined and we must solve the wave equation
with the global boundary conditions. We may find locally a
solution to the wave equation based on the consideration of
the local interactions, but that is not good enough. The wave
equation must also satisfy boundary conditions that are far
away from the place where the electron is interacting. The
QM probabilities are defined with respect to the global ge-
ometry of the set-up. This global geometry is fundamentally
non-local in the sense that the local interactions of the electron
cannot be affected by all aspects of the geometry. Due to this
fact the ensuing probability distribution is also non-locally de-
fined. This claim may look startling. To make sense of it we
propose the following slogan, which we will explain below:
“We are not studying electrons with the measuring device, we
are studying the measuring device with electrons”. This slo-
gan introduces a paradigm shift that will grow to a leading
principle as we go along. We can call it the holographic prin-
ciple (see below).
In fact, we cannot measure the interference pattern in the
double-slit experiment with one electron impact on a detec-
tor screen. We must make statistics of many electron impacts.
We must thus use many electrons and measure a probability
distribution for them. The probabilities must be defined in a
globally self-consistent way. The definitions of the probabil-
ities that prevail at one slit may therefore be subject to com-
patibility constraints imposed by the definitions that prevail at
the other slit. We are thus measuring the probability distribu-
tion of an ensemble of electrons in interaction with the whole
device. While a single electron cannot “know” if the other slit
is open or otherwise, the ensemble of electrons will “know”
it, because all parts of the measuring device will eventually
be explored by the ensemble of electrons if this ensemble is
large enough, i.e. if our statistics are good enough. When this
is the case, the interference pattern will appear. Reference [6]
gives actually a nice illustration of how the interference pat-
tern builds up with time.
The geometry of the measuring device is non-local in the
sense that a single electron cannot explore all aspects of the
4set-up through its local interactions. There is no contradiction
with relativity in the fact that the probabilities for these lo-
cal interactions must fit into a global probability scheme that
is dictated also by parts of the set-up a single electron cannot
probe. We must thus realize howEuclidean geometry contains
information that in essence is non-local, because it cannot all
be probed by a single particle, but that this is not in contra-
diction with the theory of relativity. The very Lorentz frames
used to write down the Lorentz transformations are non-local
because they assume that all clocks in the frame are synchro-
nized up to infinite distance. It is by no means possible to
achieve this, such that the very tool of a Lorentz frame con-
ceptually violates the theory of relativity. But this remains
without any practical incidence on the validity of the theory.
V. A CLASSICAL ANALOGY
We can render these ideas clear by an analogy. Imagine a
country that sends out spies to an enemy country. The elec-
trons behave as this army of spies. The double-slit set-up is
the enemy country. The physicist is the country that sends out
the spies. Each spy is sent to a different part of the enemy’s
country, chosen by a random generator. They will all take
photographs of the part of the enemy country they end up in.
The spies may have an action radius of only a kilometer. Some
of the photographs of different spies will overlap. These pho-
tographs correspond to the spots left by the electrons on your
detector. If the army of spies you send out is large enough,
then in the end the army will have made enough photographs
to assemble a very detailed complete map of the country. That
map corresponds to the interference pattern. In assembling the
global map from the small local patches presented by the pho-
tographs we must make sure that the errors do not accumu-
late such that everything fits together self-consistently. This
is somewhat analogous with the boundary conditions of the
wave function that must be satisfied globally, whereby we can
construct the global wave function also by assembling patches
of local solutions. The tool one can use to ensure this global
consistency is a Huyghens’ principle. An example of such
a Huyghens’ principle is Feynman’s path integral method or
Kirchhoff’s method in optics. The principle is non-local and is
therefore responsible for the fact that we must carry out calcu-
lations that are purely mathematical but have no real physical
meaning. They may look incomprehensible if we take them
literally, because they may involve e.g. backward propaga-
tion in space and even in time [7, 8], not to mention photons
traveling faster than light.
The interference pattern presents this way the information
about the whole experimental set-up. It does not present this
information directly but in an equivalent way, by an integral
transform. This can be seen from Born’s treatment of the scat-
tering of particles of mass m0 by a potential Vs, which leads
to the differential cross section:
dσ
dΩ
=
m0
4pi2
|F (Vs)(q)|2, (3)
where p = ~q is the momentum transfer. The integral trans-
form is here the Fourier transform F , which is a even a one-
to-one mapping. This result is derived within the Born ap-
proximation and is therefore an approximate result. In a more
rigorous setting, the integral transform could be e.g. the one
proposed by Dirac [9], which Feynman was able to use to
derive the Schro¨dinger equation [10]. The Huyghens’ prin-
ciples used by Feynman and Kirchhoff are derived from in-
tegral transforms to which they correspond. (In Feynman’s
path integral there will be paths that thread through both slits,
which shows that ψ3 = ψ1 + ψ2 is not rigorously exact). In a
double-slit experiment, Vs embodies just the geometry of the
set-up. Combined with a reference beam F (Vs)(q) yields its
hologram. The spies in our analogy are not correlated and
not interacting, but the information about the country is cor-
related: It is the information we put on a map. The map will
e.g. show correlations in the form of long straight lines, roads
that stretch out for thousands of miles, but none of your spies
will have seen these correlations and the global picture. They
just have seen the local picture of the things that were situated
within their action radius. The global picture, the global in-
formation about the enemy country is non-local, and contains
correlations, but it can nevertheless be obtained if you send out
enough spies to explore the whole country, and it will show on
the map assembled. That is what we are aiming at by invoking
the non-locality of the Lorentz frame and the non-locality of
the wave function. The global information gathered by many
electrons contains the information how many slits are open. It
is that kind of global information about your set-up that is con-
tained in the wave function. You need many single electrons
to collect that global information. A single electron just gives
you one impact on the detector screen. That is almost no infor-
mation. Such an impact is a Dirac delta measure, derived from
the Fourier transform of a flat distribution. It contains hardly
any information about the set-up because it does not provide
any contrast. This global geometry contains thus more infor-
mation than any single electron can measure through its local
interactions. And it is here that the paradox creeps in. The
probabilities are not defined locally, but globally. The inter-
actions are local and in following our intuition, we infer from
this that the definitions of the probabilities will be local as
well, but they are not. The space wherein the electrons travel
in the double-slit experiment is not simply connected, which
is, as we will see, a piece of global, topological information
apt to profoundly upset the way we must define probabilities.
VI. HIGHLY SIMPLIFIED DESCRIPTIONS STILL CATCH
THE ESSENCE
The description of the experimental set-up we use to cal-
culate a wave function is conventionally highly idealized and
simplified. Writing an equation that would make it possible
to take into account all atoms of the macroscopic device in
the experimental set-up is a hopeless task. Moreover, the total
number of atoms in “identical” experimental set-ups is only
approximately identical. In such a description there is no
thought for the question if the local interaction of a neutron
5involves a spin flip or otherwise. Despite its crudeness, such a
purely geometrical description is apt to seize a crucial ingredi-
ent of any experiment whereby interference occurs. It is able
to account for the difference between set-ups with one and two
slits, as in solving the wave equation we unwittingly avoid the
pitfall of ignoring the difference between globally and locally
defined probabilities, rendering the solution adopted tacitly
global. In this sense the probability paradoxwe are confronted
with is akin to Bertrand’s paradox in probability calculus. It is
not sufficient to calculate the interaction probabilities locally.
We must further specify how we will use these probabilities
later on in the procedure to fit them into a global picture. The
probabilities will be only unambiguously defined if we define
simultaneously the whole protocol we will use to calculate
with them.
VII. WINNOWING OUT THE OVER-INTERPRETATIONS
It is now time to get rid of the particle-wave duality. Elec-
trons are always particles, never waves. As pointed out by
Feynman, electrons are always particles because a detector
detects always a full electron at a time, never a fraction of an
electron. Electrons never travel like a wave through both slits
simultaneously. But in a sense, their probability distribution
does. It is the probability distribution of many electrons which
displays wave behaviour and acts like a flowing liquid, not the
individual electrons themselves. This postulate only reflects
literally what QM says, viz. that the wave function is a prob-
ability amplitude, and that it behaves like a wave because it
is obtained as the solution of a wave equation. Measuring
the probabilities requires measuring many electrons, such that
the probability amplitude is a probability amplitude defined
by considering an ensemble of electrons [11] with an ensem-
ble of possible histories. Although this sharp dichotomy is
very clearly present in the rules, we seem to loose sight of
it when we are reasoning intuitively. This is due to a ten-
dency towards “Hineininterpretierung” in terms of Broglie’s
initial idea that the particles themselves, not their probability
distributions, would be waves. These heuristics have histori-
cally been useful but are reading more into the issue than there
really is. Their addition blurs again the very accurate sharp
pictures provided by QM. With hindsight, we must therefore
dispense with the particle-wave duality. The rules of QM are
clear enough in their own right: In claro non interpretatur!
Wave functions also very obviously do not collapse. They
serve to describe a statistical ensemble of possible events, not
outcomes of single events.
It is also time to kill the traditional reading of ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ψ2
in terms of a “superposition principle”, based on the wave pic-
ture. It is is only a convenient numerical recipe, a Huyghens’
principle without true physical meaning. We can make the ex-
periment in such a way that only one electron is emitted by the
source every quarter of an hour. Still the interference pattern
will build up if we wait long enough. But if ψ1 and ψ2 were to
describe the correct probabilities from slit S1 and slit S2, we
would never be able to explain destructive interference. How
could a second electron that travels through slit S2 erase the
impact made on the detector screen of an electron that trav-
eled through slit S1 hours earlier? We may speculate that the
electron feels whether the other slit is open or otherwise. E.g.
the electron might polarize the charge distribution inside the
measuring device and the presence of the other slit might in-
fluence this induced charge distribution. This would be an
influence at a distance that is not incompatible with the theory
of relativity. But this scenario is not very likely. As pointed
out by Feynman interference is a universal phenomenon. It
exists also for photons, neutrons, helium atoms, etc... We al-
ready capture the essence of this universal phenomenon in a
simple, crude geometrical description of the macroscopic set-
up of the experiment. While this could be a matter of pure
luck according to the principle that fortune favors fools, it is
not likely that one could translate the scenario evoked for elec-
trons to an equivalent scenario in all these different situations.
E.g. how could the fact that another slit is open (in a nm-
sized double-slit experiment) affect the nuclear process at the
fm scale of the spin flip of a neutron? The generality of the
scenario based on an influence at a distance is thus not very
likely.
We must thus conclude that ψ3 = ψ1⊞ψ2 is a very good nu-
merical approximation for the true wave function ψ′
3
, whereby
the physically meaningful identity reads ψ′
3
= ψ′
1
+ψ′
2
in terms
of other wave functions ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
. The wave functions ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
must now both be zero, ψ′
1
(r) = ψ′
2
(r) = 0, in all
places r where we have “destructive interference”, because
p3 = p1 + p2 must still be valid. In other words ψ1 , ψ
′
1
and
ψ2 , ψ
′
2
.
VIII. UNDECIDABILITY
We can further improve our intuition for this by another ap-
proach that addresses more the way we study electrons with
the set-up and is based on undecidablity. The concept of un-
decidablity has been formalized in mathematics, which pro-
vides many examples of undecidable questions. Examples
occur e.g. in Go¨del’s theorem [12]. The existence of such
undecidable questions may look hilarious to common sense
but this does not need to be. In fact, the reason for the exis-
tence of such undecidable questions is that the set of axioms
of the theory is incomplete. We can complete then the the-
ory by adding an axiom telling the answer to the question is
“yes”, or by adding an axiom telling the answer to the question
is “no”. The two alternatives permit to stay within a system
based on binary logic (“tertium non datur”) and lead to two
different axiomatic systems and thus to two different theories.
An example of this are Euclidean and hyperbolic geometry
[13]. In Euclidean geometry one has added on the fifth par-
allels postulate to the first four postulates of Euclid, while in
hyperbolic geometry one has added on an alternative postu-
late that is at variance with the parallels postulate. We are
actually not forced to make a choice: We can decide to study
a “pre-geometry”, wherein the question remains undecidable.
The axiom one has to add can be considered as information
that was lacking in the initial set of four axioms. Without
adding it one cannot address the yes-or-no question which re-
6veals that the axiomatic system without the parallels postulate
added is incomplete. As Go¨del has shown, we will almost al-
ways run eventually into such a problem of incompleteness.
On the basis of Poincare´’s mapping between hyperbolic and
Euclidean geometry [13], we can appreciate which informa-
tion was lacking in the first four postulates. The information
was not enough to identify the straight lines as really straight,
as we could still interpret the straight lines in terms of half
circles in a half plane.
When the interactions are coherent in the double-slit ex-
periment, the question through which one of the two slits the
electron has traveled is very obviously also experimentally un-
decidable. Just like in mathematics, this is due to lack of in-
formation. We just do not have the information that could
permit us telling which way the electron has gone. This is
exactly what Feynman pointed out so carefully. In his lec-
ture he considers three possibilities for our observation of the
history of an electron: “slit S1”, “slit S2”, and “not seen”.
The third option corresponds exactly to this concept of un-
decidability. He works this out with many examples in ref-
erence [1], to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between undecidability and coherence. Coherence already oc-
curs in a single-slit experiment, where it is at the origin of the
diffraction fringes. But in the double-slit experiment the lack
of knowledge becomes all at once amplified to an objective
undecidability of the question through which slit the electron
has traveled, which does not exist in the single-slit experiment.
What happens here in the required change of the definition
of the probabilities has nothing to do with a change in local
physical interactions. It has only to do with the question how
we define a probability with respect to a body of available
information. The probabilities are in a sense conditional be-
cause they depend on the information available. As the lack
of information is different in the double-slit experiment, the
body of information available changes, such that the probabil-
ities must be defined in a completely different way (Bertrand’s
paradox). Information biases probabilities, which is why in-
surance companies ask their clients to fill forms requesting
information about them.
We have methods to deal with such bias. According to
common-sense intuition whereby we reason only on the lo-
cal interactions, opening or closing the other slit would not
affect the probabilities or only affect them slightly, but this is
wrong. We may also think that the undecidability is just ex-
perimental such that it would not matter for performing our
probability calculus. We may reckon that in reality, the elec-
tron must have gone through one of the two slits anyway. We
argue then that we can just assume that half of the electrons
went one way, and the other half of the electrons the other
way, and that we can then use statistical averaging to simu-
late the reality, just like we do in classical statistical physics
to remove bias. We can verify this argument by detailed QM
calculations. We can calculate the solutions of the three wave
equations in Eq. 1 and compare |ψ3|2 with the result of our
averaging procedure based on |ψ1|2 and |ψ2|2. This will repro-
duce the disagreement between the experimental data and our
classical intuition, confirming QM is right.
To make sense of this we may argue that we are not used
to logic that allows for undecidability. Decided histories with
labels S1 or S2 occur in a theory based on a system of axioms
A1 (binary logic), while the undecided histories occur in a
theory based on an all together different system of axiomsA2
(ternary logic). In fact, the averaging procedure is still correct
in A2 because the electron travels indeed either through S1
or through S2 following binary logic. But the information we
obtain about the electron’s path does not follow binary logic.
It follows ternary logic.
Due to the information bias the probabilities |ψ′
1
|2 and |ψ′
2
|2
to be used inA2 are very different from the probabilities |ψ1|2
and |ψ2|2 to be used inA1. The paradox results thus from the
fact that we just did not imagine that such a difference could
exist. Assuming ψ′
j
= ψ j, for j = 1, 2 amounts to neglecting
the ternary bias of the information contained in our data and
reflects the fact that we are not aware of the global character
of the definition of the probabilities. To show that the intu-
ition ψ′
j
= ψ j, for j = 1, 2 is wrong, nothing is better than
giving a counterexample. The counterexample is the double-
slit experiment where clearly the probability is not given by
p3 = |ψ1|2 + |ψ2|2 but by p3 = |ψ′1|2 + |ψ′2|2 ≈ |ψ1 ⊞ ψ2|2, where
the index 3 really refers to the third (undecidable) option. It is
then useless to insist any further.
The undecidability criterion corresponds to a global con-
straint that has a spectacular impact on the definition of the
probabilities. The probabilities are conditional and not abso-
lute. They are physically defined by the physical information
gathered from the interactions with the set-up, not absolutely
by some absolute divine knowledge about the path the elec-
tron has taken. The set-up biases the information we can ob-
tain about that divine knowledge by withholding a part of the
information about it. Einstein is perfectly right that the Moon
is still out there when we are not watching. But we cannot find
out that the Moon is there if we do not register any of its inter-
actions with its environment, even if it is there. If we do not
register any information about the existence of the Moon, then
the information contained in our experimental results must be
biased in such a way that everything looks as though theMoon
were not there [14]. Therefore, in QM the undecidability must
affect the definition of the probabilities and bias them, such
that p′
j
, p j, for j = 1, 2. The experimental probabilities must
reflect the undecidability. In a rigorous formulation, this un-
decidability becomes a consequence of the fact that the wave
function must be a function, because it is the integral trans-
form of the potential, which must represent all the informa-
tion about the set-up and its built-in undecidability. As the
phase of the wave function corresponds to the spin angle of
the electron, even this angle is thus uniquely defined.
IX. THE CORRECT ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENT
This idea is worked out in reference [5], pp. 329-333, and
depends critically on the fact that the space traversed by the
electrons that end up in the detector is not simply connected.
It is based on the simplifying ansatz that the way the elec-
tron travels through the set-up from a point r1 to a point r2
has no incidence whatsoever on the phase difference of the
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Aharonov-Bohm type of argument: For two alternative paths
Γ1 and Γ2 between r1 and r2, we have [
∫
Γ1
Edt − p·dr ] −
[
∫
Γ2
Edt − p·dr ] = 2pin, where n ∈ Z. The union of the two
paths defines a loop. In a single-slit experiment this loop can
be shrunk continuously to point which can be used to prove
that n = 0. In a double-slit experiment the loop cannot be
shrunk to a point when Γ1 and Γ2 are threading through differ-
ent slits, such that n , 0 becomes then possible. Each interfer-
ence fringe corresponds to one value of n ∈ Z. A phase differ-
ence of 2pin occurs also in the textbook approach where one
argues that to obtain constructive interference the difference in
path lengths behind the slits must yield a phase difference 2pin.
But this resemblance does not run deep and is superficial. The
textbook approach deals with phase differences between ψ1
and ψ2 in special points r2, while our approach deals with dif-
ferent phases built up over paths Γ1 and Γ2 within ψ3 = ψ1⊞ψ2
for all points r2.
We can approach this somewhat differently. We will show
that the textbook quantum mechanics prescription ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞
ψ2 belongs to “pre-geometry” in the analogy we discussed
above. We accept that the question throughwhich slit the elec-
tron has traveled is undecidable and accept ternary logic. We
should then play the game and not attempt in any instance to
reason about the question which way the electron has trav-
eled, because this information is not available. But we can
also add a new axiom, the axiom of the existence of a divine
perspective, rendering the question decidable for a divine ob-
server who can also observe the information withheld by the
set-up. We must then also play the game and accept the fact
that the probabilities we will discuss can no longer be mea-
sured, such that the conclusions we draw will now no longer
be compelled by experimental evidence but by the pure bi-
nary logic imposed by the addition of the axiom. We take the
exact solution ψ′
3
of the double-slit experiment and try to de-
termine the parts ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
of it that stem from slits S1 and
S2. We can mentally imagine such a partition without mak-
ing a logical error because each electron must go through one
of the slits, even if we will never know which one. We have
thus ψ′
3
= ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
. We expect that ψ′
1
(r) must vanish on slit
S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) on slit S1, but we must refrain here from jump-
ing to conclusions by deciding that ψ′
1
= ψ1 and ψ
′
2
= ψ2.
We can only attribute probabilities |ψ′
1
|2 and |ψ′
2
|2 to the slits,
based on the lack of experimental knowledge. We will use
ψ′
3
= ψ3 = ψ1⊞ψ2 in our calculations, as we know it is a good
numerical approximation. Let us call the part of R3 behind
the slits V . Following the idea that ψ′
1
(r) would have to vanish
on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) on slit S1, we subdivide V in a region Z1
where ψ′
1
(r) = 0 and a region N1 where ψ
′
1
(r) , 0. We define
Z2 and N2 similarly. In the region N1 ∩ Z2 we can multiply
ψ′
1
by an arbitrary phase eıχ1 without changing |ψ′
1
(r)|2. In the
region Z1 this is true as well as |ψ′1(r)|2 = 0. Similarly ψ′2(r)
can be multiplied by an an arbitrary phase eıχ2 in the regions
Z2 and Z1 ∩ N2. Let us now address the region N1 ∩ N2. We
must certainly have |ψ′
1
(r)|2 + |ψ′
2
(r)|2 = |ψ3(r)|2, because the
probabilities for going through slit S1 and for going through
slit S2 are mutually exclusive and must add up to the total
probability of transmission. We might have started to doubt
about the correctness of this idea, due to the way textbooks
present the problem, but we should never have doubted. Let
us thus put ψ′
1
(r) = |ψ3(r)| cosα eıα1 , ψ′2(r) = |ψ3(r)| sinα eıα2 ,
∀r ∈ N1 ∩ N2 = W. In fact, if ψ′j is a partial solution for
the slit S j, ψ
′
j
eıα j will also be a partial solution for the slit S j.
We must take here α, α1 and α2 as constants. If we took a
solution whereby α, α1 and α2 were functions of r, the result
obtained would no longer be a solution of the Schro¨dinger
equation in free space, due to the terms containing the spatial
derivatives of α, α1 and α2 which are not zero. In first in-
stance this argument shows also that we must take χ1 = α1 and
χ2 = α2. We do not have to care about the phases χ1 and χ2
in the single-slit experiments, but this changes in the double-
slit experiment, because we must make things work out glob-
ally. Over N1 ∩ Z2, we must have ψ′1(r) = ψ3(r) = ψ1(r), as
ψ2(r) = 0. Similarly, (∀r ∈ N2 ∩Z1 ) (ψ′2(r) = ψ3(r) = ψ2(r) )
as ψ1(r) = 0. Then
∫
W
|ψ′
1
(r)|2 dr = cos2 α
∫
W
|ψ′
3
(r)|2 dr
and
∫
W
|ψ′
2
(r)|2 dr = sin2 α
∫
W
|ψ′
3
(r)|2 dr. Due to the sym-
metry, we must have
∫
W
|ψ′
2
(r)|2 dr =
∫
W
|ψ′
1
(r)|2 dr, such
that α = pi
4
. We see from this that not only
∫
W
|ψ′
2
(r)|2 dr =∫
W
|ψ′
1
(r)|2 dr = 1
2
∫
W
|ψ′
3
(r)|2 dr, but also |ψ′
2
(r)|2 = |ψ′
1
(r)|2 =
1
2
|ψ′
3
(r)|2. In each point r ∈ W the probability that the electron
has traveled through a slit to get to r is equal to the probabil-
ity that it has traveled through the other slit. This is due to the
undecidability. The choices α1 , 0, α2 , 0 we have to impose
on the phases, are embodying here the idea that a solution of a
Schro¨dinger equation with potential V j, for j = 1, 2 cannot be
considered as a solution of a Schro¨dinger equation with po-
tential V3. The conditions we have to impose on α1 and α2
are thus a kind of disguised boundary conditions. They are
not true boundary boundaries, but a supplementary condition
(a logical constraint) that we want ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
to obey “divine”
binary logic.
We can summarize these results as ψ′
1
= 1√
2
|ψ1 ⊞ ψ2| eıα1
and ψ′
2
= 1√
2
|ψ1 ⊞ψ2| eıα2 . Let us write ψ1 ⊞ψ2 = |ψ1 ⊞ψ2| eıχ.
We can now calculate α1 and α2 by identification. This yields
onW:
ψ′
1
=
|ψ1⊞ψ2 | eı(χ+
pi
4
)
√
2
= 1√
2
(ψ1 ⊞ ψ2) e
+ı pi
4 , ψ1
ψ′
2
=
|ψ1⊞ψ2 | eı(χ−
pi
4
)
√
2
= 1√
2
(ψ1 ⊞ ψ2) e
−ı pi
4 , ψ2
(4)
What this shows is that the rule ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 is logically
flawed, because the correct expression is ψ′
3
= ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
. We
were able to get an inkling of this loophole by noticing that
ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 is not rigorously exact, even if it is an excel-
lent approximation. The differences between ψ′
j
and ψ j, for
j = 1, 2, are not negligible. The phases of ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
always
differ by pi
2
such that they are fully correlated. The difference
between the phases of ψ1 and ψ2 can be anything. They can
be opposite (destructive interference) or identical (construc-
tive interference). In fact, in contrast to ψ1 and ψ2, ψ
′
1
and
ψ′
2
reproduce the oscillations of the interference pattern. In
this respect, the fact that α1 and α2 are different by a fixed
8amount is crucial. It permits to make up for the normalization
factor 1√
2
and end up with the correct numerical result of the
flawed calculation ψ1 ⊞ ψ2. The phases of ψ
′
1
and ψ′
2
conspire
to render ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
equal to ψ1 ⊞ ψ2.
However, at the boundaries of N1 ∩ Z2 and N2 ∩ Z1 with
W there are awkward discontinuities. In N1 ∩ Z2, we must
have ψ′
1
(r) = ψ1(r), while in N1 ∩ N2, we have ψ′1(r) =
1√
2
(ψ1(r) ⊞ ψ2(r)) e
+ı pi
4 . The difference between the solutions
is
ψ3(r)√
2
eı(χ−
pi
4
). This is the value ψ′
2
(r) would take over N1 ∩Z2
if we extrapolated it from W to N1 ∩ Z2. We can consider
that we can accept this discontinuity at the boundary, because
over N1 ∩ Z2, the question through which slit the electron has
traveled is decidable, while over W it is undecidable, such
that there is an abrupt change of logical regime at this bound-
ary. In reality, the boundary betweenW and N1 ∩ Z2 could be
more diffuse and be the result of an integration over the slits,
such that the description is schematic and the abruptness not
real. The main aim of our calculation is to obtain a qualita-
tive understanding rather than a completely rigorous solution.
The same arguments can be repeated at the boundary between
N2 ∩ Z1 and W. If we accept this solution, then ψ′1(r) will
vanish on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) will vanish on slit S1. [15] We
can also consider these discontinuities as a serious issue. We
could then postulate that we must assume that N1 ∩ Z2 = ∅ &
N1 ∩ Z2 = ∅, in order to avoid the discontinuities. The fact
that we have to choose N1 ∩ Z2 = ∅ & N1 ∩ Z2 = ∅ would
then be a poignant illustration of the possible consequences
of undecidability. Contrary to intuition, the value we have to
attribute in a point of slit S1, to the probability that the particle
has traveled through slit S2 is now not zero as we might have
expected but 1
2
|ψ′
3
(r)|2. The experimental undecidability bi-
ases thus the probabilities such that they are no longer the “di-
vine probabilities”. The two different approaches correspond
to Einstein-like and Bohr-like viewpoints. Both approaches
are logically tenable when the detector screen is completely
in the zone W, because the quantities in N1 ∩ Z2 and N2 ∩ Z1
are then not measured quantities. Of course we could try to
measure them by putting the detector screen close to the slits,
but this would be a different experiment, leading to different
probabilities, as Feynman has pointed out in his analysis.
In analyzing the path integrals, one should recover in prin-
ciple the same results. However, the pitfall is here that one
might too quickly conclude that ψ′
j
= ψ j like in the textbook
presentations, which leads us straight into the paradox. We see
thus that the Huyghens’ principle is a purely numerical recipe
that is physically meaningless, because it searches for a cor-
rect global solution without caring about the correctness of the
partial solutions. It follows the experimental ternary logic and
therefore is allowed to mistreat the phase difference that exists
between the partial solutions ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
which always have the
same phase difference, such that they cannot interfere destruc-
tively. The rule ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ψ2 is perfectly right in ternary logic
where we decide that we do not bother which way the particle
has travelled, because that question is empirically undecid-
able. It is then empirically meaningless to separate ψ′
3
into
two parts. This corresponds to Bohr’s viewpoint. It is ten-
able because it will not be contradicted by experiment. This
changes if one wants to impose also binary logic on the wave
function, arguing that conceptually the question about the slits
should be decidable from the perspective of a divine observer.
We do need then a correct decomposition ψ′
3
= ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
. We
find then out that ψ′
j
, ψ j and we can attribute this change
between the single-slit and the double-slit probabilities to the
difference between the ways we must define probabilities in
both types of logic. If we were able by divine knowledge to
assign to each electron impact on the detector the correspond-
ing number of the slit through which the electron has traveled,
we would recover the experimental frequencies |ψ′
j
|2. This is
Einstein’s viewpoint. Having made this clear, everybody is
free to decide for himself if he prefers to study geometry in
binary logic or pre-geometry in ternary logic. But refusing
Einstein’s binary logic based on the argument that ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
cannot be measured appears to us a stronger and more frustrat-
ing Ansatz than the one that consists in introducing variables
that cannot be measured. The refusal is of course in direct line
with Heisenberg’s initial program of removing all quantities
that cannot be measured from the theory. It is Heisenberg’s
minimalism which preserves the experimental undecidability
and ternary logic within the theory. To this we can add a sup-
plementary logical constraint which enforces binary logic. As
Eq. 4 shows, the difference between the fake partial ternary
solutions ψ j and the correct partial ternary solutionsψ
′
j
(where
j = 1, 2) is much larger than we ever might have expected on
the basis of the logical loophole that ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 is not
rigorously exact. In the approach with the additional binary
constraint, whereby we follow the spirit of Bohr, we even do
not reproduce ψ′
1
(r) = 0 on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) = 0 on slit S1,
because these quantities are not measured if we assume that
they are only measured far behind the slits. In the Bohr-like
approach, the conditions ψ′
1
(r) = 0 on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) = 0 on
slit S1 are thus not correct boundary conditions for a measure-
ment far behind the slits, because they violate the Ansatz of
experimental undecidability. The bias in the experimentally
measured probabilities due to the undecidability cannot be re-
moved by the divine knowledge about the history. If we want
a set-up with the boundary conditions that correspond to the
unbiased case whereby ψ′
1
(r) = 0 on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) = 0 on
slit S1, we must assume that the detector screen is put imme-
diately behind the slits, and the interference pattern can then
not be measured, while everything becomes experimentally
decidable. Otherwise, we must assume that ψ′
1
(r) and ψ′
2
(r)
are not measured on the slits such that they can satisfy the un-
decidable solution in Eq. 4. The partial probabilities given
by ψ′
1
(r) and ψ′
2
(r) are thus extrapolated quantities, and they
are only valid within one set-up with a well-defined position
of the detector screen. Even in the pure Heisenberg approach
whereby one postulates that we are not allowed to ask through
which slit the electron has traveled, the wave function contains
extrapolated quantities that are not measured, despite the orig-
inal agenda of that approach. We see also that there is always
an additional logical constraint that must be added in order to
account for the fact that the options of traveling through the
slits S1 or S2 are mutually exclusive. This has been systemat-
ically overlooked, with the consequence that one obtains the
result p , p1 + p2, which is impossible to make sense of. It is
9certainly not justified to use p , p1 + p2 as a starting basis for
raising philosophical issues. Moreover, imposing the bound-
ary condition that ψ′
1
(r) = 0 on slit S2 and ψ
′
2
(r) = 0 on slit
S1 remains a matter of choice, depending on which vision one
wants to follow. If we do not clearly point out this choice, then
confusion can enter the scene and lead to paradoxes, because
adding this boundary condition amounts to adding informa-
tion and information biases the definition of the probabilities.
In summary, ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 is wrong if we cheat by wanting
to satisfy also binary logic in the analysis of an experiment
that follows ternary logic by attributing meaning to ψ1 and
ψ2. But it yields the correct numerical result for the total wave
function if we play the game and respect the empirical unde-
cidability by not asking which way the particle has traveled.
We can thus only uphold that the textbook rule ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2
is correct if we accept that the double-slit experiment experi-
mentally follows ternary logic. Within binary logic, the agree-
ment of the numerical result with the experimental data is mis-
leading, as such an agreement does not provide a watertight
proof for the correctness of a theory. If a theory contains log-
ical and mathematical flaws, then it must be wrong despite its
agreement with experimental data [16].
Eq. 4 shows that interference does not exist, because the
phase factors eı
pi
4 and e−ı
pi
4 of ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
always add up to
√
2.
We may note in this respect that χ itself is only determined
up to an arbitrary constant within the experiment. The wave
function can thus not become zero due to phase differences
between ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
like happens with ψ1 and ψ2 in ψ1 ⊞ ψ2.
When ψ′
3
is zero, both ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
are zero. Interference thus
only exists within the purely numerical, virtual reality of the
Huyghen’s principle, which is not a narrative of the real world.
We must thus not only dispose of the particle-wave duality,
but also be very wary of the wave pictures we build based on
the intuition we gain from experiments in water tanks. These
pictures are apt to conjure up a very misleading imagery that
leads to fake conceptual problems and stirs a lot of confusion.
The phase of the wave function has physical meaning, and
spinors can only be added meaningfully if we get their phases
right.
While this solves the probability paradox, we may still ask
also for a better understanding of the reasons why the inter-
ference pattern occurs in ternary logic. In fact, up to now,
we have only discussed the phases. We must also discuss
the amplitudes of the wave functions. Let us observe in this
respect that ψ
′∗
1
(r)ψ′
2
(r) + ψ′
1
(r)ψ
′∗
2
(r) = 0,∀r ∈ V , such
that ψ′
1
(r) and ψ′
2
(r) are everywhere in V orthogonal with re-
spect to the Hermitian norm. This result actually ensures that
|ψ′
1
+ψ′
2
|2 = |ψ′
1
|2+|ψ′
2
|2 such ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
are describingmutually
exclusive probabilities. To obtain this orthogonality condition
we must have actually that ψ′
1
= ψ′
2
e±ı
pi
2 . When this condition
is fulfilled, and ψ′
1
is zero in slit S2 and ψ
′
2
is zero in slit S1
the functions ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
become exact wave functions for the
double-slit experiment. They can then actually be summed
according the superposition principle. Let us now assume that
there exists a wave function ζ for the double-slit experiment.
We do not assume here that we know that ζ = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 must
be true, such that we do not know that it corresponds to an
interference pattern. But it must be possible to decompose it
into unknown functions ζ1 and ζ2 according to binary logic as
described for ψ′
1
and ψ′
2
above. We can consider a continu-
ous sweep over the detector screen from the left to the right,
whereby we are visiting the points P. Let us call the source S,
and the centres of the slits C1 and C2 and reduce the widths
of the slits such that only C1 and C2 are open. The phase dif-
ferences over the paths SC1P through ψ1 and SC2P through
ψ2 will then continuously vary along this sweep. To be unde-
cidable and obey ternary logic, the total wave function would
have to be completely symmetrical with respect to ζ1 and ζ2,
such that it would have to be ζ1+ζ2. This is the reason why we
have to do QM and calculate |ζ1 + ζ2|2. But simultaneously, ζ1
and ζ2 would have to be mutually exclusive and satisfy binary
logic because “God would know”. All points were the phase
difference is not ± pi
2
(mod 2pi) should therefore have zero am-
plitude and not belong to the domain of ζ where ζ , 0. This
shows that ζ must correspond to an interference pattern. From
this point of view, an interference pattern (with its quantiza-
tion of momentum p = hq) appears then as the only solution
for the wave function that can satisfy simultaneously the re-
quirements imposed by the binary and the ternary logic. The
real experiment with non-zero slit widths would not yield the
Dirac comb but a blurred result due to integration over the
finite widths of the slits. A different point D2 , C2 might in-
deed provide an alternative path SD2P that leads to the correct
phase difference pi
2
with SC1P. Let us call the width of the slits
w and the wavelength λ. The smaller the ratio λ/w the eas-
ier it will be to find such points D2. We can achieve this by
increasing the energy of the electron, but this will eventually
render the interactions incoherent such that we end up in the
classical tennis ball regime. A far more interesting way is to
change λ/w by fiddling with the geometry of the set-up. Fi-
nally note that the phase difference of ± pi
2
(mod 2pi) over the
paths SS1P through ψ
′
1
and SS2P through ψ
′
2
is not in contra-
diction with the phase difference 2pin over the paths SS1P and
SS2P through ψ3 we discussed above, because ψ3 = ψ
′
1
+ ψ′
2
.
The true reason why we can calculate ψ′
3
= ψ′
1
+ ψ′
2
as
ψ3 = ψ1 ⊞ ψ2 can within the Born approximation also be ex-
plained by the linearity of the Fourier transform used in Eq.
3 [4], which is a better argument than invoking the linearity
of the wave equation. The path integral result is just a more
refined equivalent of this, based on a more refined integral
transform. The reason for the presence of the Fourier trans-
form in the formalism is the fact that the electron spins [4, 5].
One can derive the whole wave formalism purely classically,
just from the assumption that the electron spins. Eq. 3 hinges
also crucially on the Born rule p = |ψ|2. There is no rigor-
ous proof for this rule but there exists ample justification for it
[4]. The undecidability is completely due to the properties of
the potential which defines both the local interactions and the
global symmetry.
The different fringes in the interference pattern are due to
the fact that one of the electrons has traveled a longer path
than the other one such that it has made n ∈ N turns more. It
is thus an “older” electron. This idea could be illustrated by
making the experiment with muons in an experiment wherein
the dimensions of the set-up are tuned with respect to the de-
cay length. Due to the time decay of the muons, the question
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through which one of the slits the muon has traveled will be-
come less undecidable in the wings of the distribution and this
will have an effect on the interference pattern. Conversely,
one could imagine an interference experiment to measure a
life time.
X. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed an intelligible solution for
the paradox of the double-slit experiment. What we must learn
from it is that there is no way one can use probabilities ob-
tained from one experiment in the analysis of another exper-
iment. The probabilities are conditional and context-bound.
Combining results from different contexts in a same calcu-
lation should therefore be considered as taboo. In deriving
Bell-type inequalities one transgresses this taboo. A much
more detailed account of this work is given in reference [4],
which fills many gaps and also explains how the same argu-
ment of context dependence can be applied to paradoxes re-
lated to Bell-type inequalities.
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